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Abstract
On the premise that language is untranslatable a priori into another (Ricoeur), this essay 
suggests that the task of the translator is not only to translate what words express, but 
likewise what they do not express. The translation of the expressionless word (Benjamin) 
leads the translator into the realm of the self, imagined vis-à-vis language and culture. It is 
through the imagination that the self encounters the non-self (Fichte), i.e. the expressionless 
self that complements the expressed self. The ultimate task of translation—it is thus 
argued—equally requires the translation of the non-self, i.e. the poetization (Novalis) 
of the human confined in exact language. Poetization—the dynamic act of overcoming 
oneself—discovers the untranslatable, irrational, non-self uttering the expressionless word. 
Translation as poetization frees language from being deceived by itself, and the self from 
being confined in language.
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Introduction
Traditional translation studies time and again point to an underlying clash of 
theories rooted in varied philosophical presuppositions. Whereas philosophy—
more specifically language philosophy—is said to “…show the fly the way out 
of the fly-bottle” (Philosophical Investigations 309), it is itself not immune from 
turning into another theory of translation that may well trap language in yet 
another fly-bottle. Heuristically supplanting linguistic essentialism/idealism 
with the conception of ordinary language as a game (Preliminary Studies 18), 
form of life (Philosophical Investigations 19), or linguistic habit that follows rules 
(Philosophical Investigations 142) and has a point (Philosophical Investigations 
564), cannot entirely claim victory over the contention that language—be it the 
grammar of a language game (Philosophical Investigations 373, 371)—points to 
an essence; whether to be found in pure ideas (c.f. Descartes, Leibniz) or direct 
experience (cf. Hamann, Wittgenstein). And essences—if we follow Aristotle—as 
distinct from appearances or accidents, are one and singular (Z 4). The apparent 
sequitur of this line of argumentation is that the essence of language, by nature, 
remains incommunicable and thus, in theory, languages constitute truths—claims 
that are philosophically incommensurable. In other words—freely borrowed from 
Ricoeur—“language is untranslatable a priori into another” (13).
 Applied to culture—purportedly an exemplary form of language (Alexander 
297)—this conviction is poetically expressed in Rudyard Kipling’s belief concerning 
the ostensible irreconcilability of Orient and Occident. The fist stanza of his famous 
“Ballad of East and West” reads: 
East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgment Seat
Then again, notwithstanding the hypothetical incommensurability of languages, 
cultures and religions, humanity has never ceased in the attempt to live together 
and converse across cultural, social, linguistic and religious borders. While Kipling’s 
impression of the fundamental differences of culture is indeed spot-on, his poetic 
wisdom does not stop there as the ballad reads on: 
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face,
tho’ they come from the ends of the earth! 
Intuitively, Kipling understood that East and West can breach their boundaries 
of truths on the common ground of humanity. Ultimately, mutually exclusive 
truths-claims share a common origin that is embedded in the depth of the human 
condition. Language and culture, along with religion, have a mutual gestation, 
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cradle, and upbringing. Thus, before East and West could think and speak, they 
could and did communicate. About what? As a matter of fact about nothing! And 
there we find the common source of all diverse and distinct truths—they have 
their beginning when and where disparate renditions of truths did not yet exist. 
Where myth is not yet displaced by philosophy—and nonsense stood face to face 
with sense in one and the same universe. That is the aeon of the paradox; the time 
anterior to truths (Gans 54). In his seminal study Paradoxes of Faith, the French 
theologian Henri de Lubac reflects, “For paradox exists everywhere in reality, 
before it exists in thought. It is everywhere in permanence. It is forever reborn” 
(10). In this world beyond worlds, William Blake muses, contradictions are not 
obstacles, but “positives.” Blake writes in his poem Milton,
There is a place where Contrarieties are equally True
This place is called Beulah. It is a pleasant lovely Shadow
Where no dispute can come . . . . (Milton 30.1-31.11 cited in Bindman 181) 
Thus, the contention of this paper is that long before languages attempt to 
communicate by searching for formal correspondences, a common set of linguistic 
codes together with the right communicative intention (Sperber and Wilson 
164), or the interplay of dynamic equivalences, they already communicate by 
not communicating at all, i.e. not by what they say, but by what remains unsaid 
in saying something. Languages, thus, firstly correspond not by what words, 
phrases, sentences and texts express, but by the unlimited possibilities that remain 
unexpressed. Thus, what has to be translated before any translation is what cannot 
be translated at all. Or freely adapted from Wittgenstein, silence has to be translated 
before the spoken word. This silence, however, is not found in words, sentences or 
texts, but in the unity and wholeness of dasein behind the diversity of day-by-day 
existence and utterances. Hence, every word that differentiates meaning likewise 
communicates a unity of meaning from which all meaning originates.
This paper, then, moves beyond questions of particular translations, or translation 
theories, and goes into the foundational paradox of language, speech and translation. 
There it encounters a realm of language before language, i.e. what Benjamin calls the 
“expressionless” word. It is the expressionless word that has to be translated before 
actual expressions can communicate with one another; or before the translator 
will have to recognize that any attempt of languages to communicate with one 
another—like the task of translation itself—will never be able to retrieve the pure 
meaning of language. Yet the continuing task of translation remains essential to 
prevent language from being seduced by the sirenic lure of discovering its singular 
pure form, and thus to enable non-discriminatory cross-cultural communication 
in today’s post-post-modern world that once again forwards the insinuation of 
superior narratives. Indeed, “Benjamin…would conclude that reality consists in ‘as 
many translations as languages’” (Baltrusch 118). The ongoing—and indeed never 
Locker / Translating the “No Man” 260
Kritika Kultura 21/22 (2013/2014): –269 © Ateneo de Manila University
<http://kritikakultura.ateneo.net>
ending—tasks of translation, therefore, saves reality from being deceived by itself, 
i.e. from the preposterous contention to be derived from only one—the so-called 
original—language. 
Then again, the point that this paper hopes to make is equally practical and truly 
palpable in daily speech, where often the most basic expressions, like “yes” or “no,” 
do not only convey concrete meaning by what they state, but likewise by what they 
do not state. Thus, even in ordinary speech, meaning and meaninglessness stand 
in a paradoxical relationship to one another. Indeed, the demand that “your ‘yes’ be 
a ‘yes’, and your ‘no’ be a ‘no’” (cf. James 5:12)—taken out of context—continues to 
force languages and cultures to exchange mystery for certainty, the numinous for 
the commonplace. 
The paradox that meaning is found alongside meaninglessness finds its 
illuminating analogy in the quantum world. Werner Heisenberg observed that the 
particle-wave duality—exhibited by quantum particles in the double-slit experiment1 
—and the created superposition of all possible states or probabilities2 mysteriously 
collapses if an observer is introduced (Berman 22). Thus what a quantum particle 
is in truth can never be seen at once. In fact, looking at it reduces its appearance 
to only one possible state. A quantum particle is what is and what it is not at the 
same time. Similarly mystifying is Schrödinger’s cat locked in a contraption with 
a fifty-fifty chance that a device that is triggered by radioactive decay causes its 
death (Brown 24). Left unobserved, the cat remains suspended between equal 
possibilities, but as soon as we open the contraption to take a look, the universe is 
altered into only one possible state, and the cat is either alive or dead. 
In returning to language, Walter Benjamin in his famous Task of the Translator 
calls this original state—what could be called the quantum state— of language 
“pure language (die reine Sprache)…which no longer means or expresses anything 
but is, as expressionless and creative Word, that which is meant in all languages.” 
Rendered into utterances, however, Benjamin continues, “All information, all 
sense, and all intention finally encounter a stratum in which they are destined to 
be extinguished.” Benjamin concludes with his well-known advice, “It is the task of 
the translator to release in his own language that pure language which is under the 
spell of another, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his re-creation of 
that work. For the sake of pure language he breaks through decayed barriers of his 
own language” (Venuti 82). In other words, the task of the translator is not only to 
translate what is said but what remains unsaid. This task, however, moves from the 
particular to the general, from the linguistic to the anthropomorphic, reaching into 
the translation of the untranslatable self. Following Benjamin’s train of thought, the 
task of the translator—this paper will argue—is to prevent the inexhaustible self of 
the translator from extinction, by overcoming oneself and reaching into the non-self, 
the “no man.” By breaking through the barriers of the self, the self will be liberated 
from its self-delusion, i.e. the belief to be established by one language alone. This 
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breaking down of barriers is accomplished by an endless play of translation, or 
what Novalis calls the “poetization” of languages.
From Analogy to Paradox (From What is Possible to 
What is Impossible)
Eve Tavor Bannet demonstrates persuasively that a somewhat similar line of 
thought can be traced in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ordinary language philosophy 
(667). Contrary to the view that words have exact definitions—like a football field 
(Wittgenstein’s most favored analogy is football) is bounded by lines—Wittgenstein 
keenly observes that, “Many words don’t have a strict meaning” (Preliminary Studies 
27). In fact, “the proper(ty of )  language  [is] always ready to be inexact” (Bannet 
667). In due course, “The grammatical rules for terms of the general proposition 
must contain the multiplicity of possible cases provided for by the proposition” 
(Philosophical Grammar 258). Words and their meaning enjoy a “freedom of 
movement” by “having no end of possible meanings and applications” and “can be 
jumped analogically, by family resemblances, from case to case” (Bannet 669). 
To translate a word is to transfer it into another region and context, i.e. to give 
it an analogous use. Analogy, Bannet explains, is open-ended and sometimes not 
similar at all (667). Indeed, Wittgenstein will tell us, “We can’t see where an [analogy] 
ceases to hold” (Lectures 109). The investigation as to where an analogy has become 
misleading, therefore, is a “...grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on 
our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning 
the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the 
forms of expression in different regions of language.” (“Philosophical Investigations” 
90). 
Grammatical investigations, for that reason, “show that there is always a 
multiplicity of other untapped possibilities already in language itself” (Bannet 
668). “Grammar is not the expression of what is the case, but of what is possible” 
(Lectures 2). “Language can only say those things that we can imagine otherwise” 
(Philosophical Remarks 54).
 It is in imagining other possible analogies, respectively, other ways of 
translating analogies from case to case, Bannet notes, “that we break the bounds of 
closed and finite grammars what otherwise would narrowly circumscribe what is—
more aptly said, what we allow—to be possible” (668). Bannet concludes, “And it is 
by imagining endless, other, unthought possibilities of language use, that we play 
the same finite set of cards, and extend to the infinite the idea that ‘the boundaries 
of my language are the boundaries of my world’ (TLP 5.6)” (668). The grammar of 
analogy is a grammar of possibilities as “Language can only say those things that 
we can imagine otherwise” (Philosophical Remarks 54). To further Wittgenstein’s 
point, the grammar of analogy can be said to be the grammar of impossibilities 
since we can always imagine the translation of words otherwise.
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The Realm of Paradox3
What lies at the heart of analogy is not what the analogy reveals, but that what 
it conceals; not the similarity to its object, but its infinitely greater dissimilarity. 
What, accordingly, lies at the heart of translation, is imagining the possibilities of 
grammar alongside its infinite, indeterminate and uncertain impossibilities. 
This hypothesis can yet be developed further. If the communication of languages 
requires the imagination of grammatical impossibilities, it likewise requires the 
imagination of the “impossible” vis-à-vis the possible. This is the realm of paradox. 
Paradoxes—most basically defined—are undomesticated truths that do not seem 
to have a regular place in the fabric of unequivocalness. Paradoxes—realities 
beyond (para) belief (doxa), contradict common sense and expectation. Paradoxes 
are truths that stand on the head (Faletta 9)—seemingly—of the diablo, the devil 
himself, the antithesis of Hermes who Baudelaire calls the wisest of angels, who 
mischievously turns God’s perfect truths upside down.
Paradoxes are truths that evidently cannot be true. They torment the 
sanctimonious intellectual. How can a liar speak the truth in lying? How can the ‘set 
of all sets’ fail to include itself? How can a human being subsist in a divine person 
possessing a divine and human nature? How can the measurement of the wave-
function of an electron cause the collapse of this function for another electron that 
simultaneously emanates from the same source, at a distance, without noticeable 
connection and faster than the speed of light?
What then do logical, religious, and physical paradoxes tell us about the world? 
One thing at best: what, and how, the world is not in its completeness. Paradoxes 
unmask the claim that the universe is unambiguous and free of contradictions as 
petitio principii, whether motivated by religious, political, or economic concerns. 
A world stripped of paradoxes is a world ruled by material concerns without an 
underlying spiritual complement. Its today has no tomorrow, and allows for only 
one conclusion reminiscent of unabashed Epicureanism: “Let us eat and drink for 
tomorrow we die” (1 Cor 15:32 RSV). Indeed, controllability and predictability are 
hailed as the glue that holds the universe together by providing the necessary order 
and meaning for our lives.
Contrary to the claims of Isms, language stripped of paradox becomes what 
Northrop Frye calls technological language (Frye 22); a language that reduces the 
self to a quantifiable object; the mystery of existence to banality. On the contrary, 
paradoxes are exceptional and precious glimpses of logical and ontic ambiguity 
that disclose the foundation of the universe; i.e. our world resting on, and drawing 
meaning from, an undivided whole. The fragments of our Dasein are embedded 
in the whole of Being; or as Hegel puts it aptly: “Das Wahre ist das Ganze” (Hegel, 
Vorrede 20.15). Ontic paradoxes point to an ontological Paradox from which 
inexhaustible meaning flows. Paradoxes inject this world with endless possibilities 
and offer the promise of immortality. Paradoxes invigorate the mind and allow the 
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soul to breathe. Resistant to analytical judgment, it is paradoxes that give rise to the 
immortal works of architecture, literature, music and the performing arts. Through 
paradoxes we find ways that lead from the bounds of our temporal existence back 
to the extra-temporal space of imagination. 
Paradoxes in language, Michael Cronin points out, are often highlighted in 
fiction and force readers as well as writers to reflect on framing procurers that make 
innovation and evaluation possible (235). As evaluation makes the reader aware of 
the invented nature of fiction, “Innovation takes place where paradox makes one 
aware of assumptions, premises, the taken for granted, the rules that govern the 
organisation of the sense.” As regard translation, Cronin concludes, “A translation 
is paradoxical because it both is and is not the original. It only exists because of 
the original…The original is simultaneously absent and present.” The awareness of 
the paradoxical status of a translation, for Cronin, allows for redrafting the rules of 
translation and accounts for the awareness of all the assumptions that are taken for 
granted in the daily use of language (236). 
 
Translation and the Impossible; Positing the Impossible 
Self
Translation, it can be argued, is born from paradox; it flows from the imagination 
of that “what is” and moreover from that “what is not.” Thus, a translation 
advances from what Kant calls the “re-productive” imagination to the “productive 
imagination.” Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View reads,
As a power of [producing] intuitions even when the object is not present, 
imagination (facultas imaginandi) is either productive or reproductive—
that is, either a power of exhibiting an object originally and so prior to 
experience (exhibitio originaria), or a power of exhibiting it in a derivative 
way, by bringing back to mind an empirical intuition we have previously had 
(exhibitio derivata). (28)
While for Kant the productive imagination—the imagination prior to experience—
remains a “production” of the subject and is posterior to the reproductive 
imagination, John Rundell points out that Fichte in his Science of Knowledge 
argues that the work of the imagination is at first found in the “self-positing self” 
(2). The constitution of innerliness precedes and grounds the constitution of the 
outside world and its objects (Rundell 7). The faculty of the imagination, for Fichte, 
represents the three-fold value of freedom: (1) The freedom of self-creation or 
self-positing, (2) the capacity for a reflexivity regarding its self-constitution and 
condition …and (3) the creation and interaction of the world of, and with others 
(Rundell 8).
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In relation to the Kantian question of how synthetic judgments may be possible, 
Fichte argues that “no synthesis is possible without preceding antithesis” (Fichte 
24). Rundell quotes, “…Just as there can be no antithesis without synthesis, no 
synthesis without antithesis, so there can be neither without thesis – an absolute 
positing, whereby an A (the self ) is neither be equated nor opposed to another, 
but is absolutely posited…it must be one” (9). This “one”, Rundell explains, is a 
process and can refer to anything other than itself. It is where the self is posited. In 
Rundell’s view, Fichte’s critical philosophy is strictly immanent if not autistic—the 
self exists, because it posits itself, and posits itself, because it exists—the self can 
only posit itself opposite the “not-self.” The self and the not-self exist co-extensively. 
The not-self is not something existing externally to the self, but is supposed by it 
(Rundell 9). 
Self-positing is limiting, yet limitless; it asserts, opposes and negates at the 
same time. The activity that causes self-positing is the productive imagination that 
“unites the opposite self and not-self” (Rundell 21). Imagination, thus, is creative 
in producing the indeterminacy of the human being; the creative imaginary that 
constitutes the universality of the human condition.
At this point, Rundell introduces Cornelus Castoriadis’ thesis of the Imaginary 
Institution of Society that challenges what the Greek philosopher deems inherited 
or identitarian thinking (23). In his multilayered critique against Marxism, 
structuralism and “the teaching of reason of the West,” Castoriadis postulates that 
the subject is not “one of and by reason, language, or intersubjectivity—he/she 
is an ontological creation, the ontology of which originates from the imagination” 
(Rundell 3). As Rundell explicates, “The subject is constituted through two 
imaginaries which, in terms of their deployment, co-exist and compete with any 
other subject, and yet are irreducible to one another. These imaginaries are the 
radical imaginary of the psyche and the social instituting and instituted imaginary 
of society” (4). Castoriadis radically questions the productive power of the solitary 
individuum as thought of in Western philosophy.
. . . the imagination of the singular human being is defunctionalized. Hegel has 
said that man is a sick animal. In truth is a mad animal, totally unfit for life, a 
species that would have disappeared as soon as it emerged if it had not proven 
itself capable, at the collective level, of another creation: society in the strict 
sense, that is, institutions embodying social imaginary significations. (148)
For Castoriadis, the imaginary of the psyche does not exhibit the rationality of 
the human animal, but its dysfunctionality. “We are the animal for which nothing 
is taken-for-granted. We can create and give form to anything” (Rundell 5). Thus, 
there exists likewise a dysfunctionality of the imagination and the forms through 
which it is represented. This dysfunctionality, Castoriadis believes, inevitably 
breaks open the “autistic closure” of the imagination and creates spaces of new 
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symbolic and institutional forms. This breaking open—Rundell explains with 
reference to Fichte—is tantamount to a “shock” from the outside, i.e. “an activity 
that is curbed from without” (34). While this shock originates from the feeling 
of dissatisfaction, it leads to what Fichte calls “a striving, the work of the not-self, 
which is wholly independent of the self for comprehension and understanding 
against the restrictedness and limitation of the outside.” The shock from the outside 
moves or opens the self to “a longing [that] aspires to realize something outside the 
self” (Rundell 34). 
While for Fichte, this shock—to avoid falling under the spell of a political rule 
by a demos, as Castoriadis would describe it— remains part of what can be called 
second-order reflexivity (Rundell 35). Its resonance may be found in the paradox 
of imagining the self in an unimaginable God. The theologian Thomas J. J. Altizer 
provides the philosophical background for this understanding. 
We can evoke an actual or real identity only by embodying difference, a real 
and an actual difference, a difference making identity manifest, and making 
it manifest as itself. Only the presence of difference calls identity forth, and it 
calls it forth in its difference from itself, in its difference from an identity that 
is eternally the same. (37)
Thus, the paradoxical revelation of God as ‘I am that I am’ (Altizer’s translation) 
is a tautology that establishes presence but not difference, and therefore, no identity. 
In Altizer’s somewhat controversial theology that shows noticeable indebtedness 
to Nietzsche, this insight leads to the conclusion that assigning to God an actual 
identity is, in effect, the death of God. Where then, Altizer surmises, lies the 
true identity of God? The answer is found in the paradox that ‘I am,’ if it does 
not establish God’s identity, implies ‘I am not.’ The negation of God’s eternal and 
non-differentiable identity embodies a paradoxical identity that is both, itself, and 
its own other (Taylor 576). According to Altizer, it is this ‘I am not’ that marks the 
act of God’s self-communication and embodiment. The ‘I am not’ is an act of self-
emptying in which identity is self-enacted and self-actualized. God’s paradoxical 
embodiment in the ‘I am not’ fully reveals his irreducible identity and self (Altizer 
71).
Conversely, being created in the image of God—as the book of Genesis poetically 
reflects—may be not, as it is commonly understood, an assertion of a self, but 
the act of positing a not-self. Not the alleged self, but this not-self mirrors God’s 
image and the human freedom of irreducibility and non-objectifiabilty. Thus, the 
irreducible otherness of God—a God whom we must not make a grave image of 
(Exo 20:4-6 RSV)—grounds the otherness of the self, that—and arguably only in 
this way—allows for the otherness of the other—who truly images God. 
In terms of translation, this insight leads to an understanding that contrary to 
intuition, translation is not simply an act of the self but, through the imagination, 
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constitutes the self. This self is found in the paradoxical play of the self and the 
imagined not-self. It is the not-self of the translator that imagines the impossibilities 
of meaning that grounds all possible meanings of a translated text.
Conclusion
Translation in general, it is argued, is embedded in the Ganzheit, the totality, 
of language, or—as Hamann expresses it—in its poetry. The entirety of language 
reveals itself in the totality of human life, i.e. the paradoxical human life of the 
self in communion and conversation with the not-self. This life of “no man”—the 
Odyssian “outis”—is the ground of translation that—according to Novalis—is “the 
act of overcoming (sich selbst überspringen) oneself…as genesis of life” (Baltrusch 
117).4 At this Urpunct the linguistic and anthropomorphic dimensions of language 
converge. Proceeding from the arche, the “”in the beginning” of language, 
translation takes to the form of Novalis’ project of the poetization of the sciences—
in particular Fichte’s Science of Knowledge—which is based on the conviction that by 
representing indivisible categories, all scientific ideas are related and transferable. 
Similar to Fichte, the “I” for Novalis is only understood in so far as it is represented 
by the “non-I.” To make one science, like mathematics, intelligible, it has first to be 
represented by another science, which in turn has to be represented by yet another 
science. Poetization is an ongoing and reciprocal process. Novalis introduces 
here the Umkehrungsmethode—the method of reversal—that results in a ‘poetry 
of mathematics’ and a ‘mathematics of poetry.’ This schema is further redoubled 
by reflexivity, revealing a poetry of poetry, and a mathematics of mathematics 
(Berman 84). Antoine Berman explains Novalis’ enigmatic concept: “The self-
reflection of a science is the other side of its reflection in another science, of it 
symbolization by another science” (84). In the words of Novalis, “Every symbol can 
be symbolized by what it symbolizes—countersymbol. But there is also a symbol 
of symbols—intersymbols . . . everything can be symbol of the other—symbolic 
function” (Bermann 84). Poetization, however, has a super-structure. It follows the 
law of potentiation, “from the low to the high, the empirical to the abstract, the 
philosophical to the poetic, into the state of mystery” (Berman 95). Poetization, 
thus, is the ascending translation of the concrete into the abstract and back, 
the empirical into the universal and back. In the words of Novalis, poetization 
requires that the magician uses the language of mathematics, and that the poet, 
the rhetorician and the philosopher play and compose grammatically. A fugue—
Novalis points out—is entirely logical or scientific. To conclude with a quote from 
Novalis: Our language—it was very musical from the beginning. It should once 
again become a song.
Translation, this paper argues, is foremost and primarily the poetization of the 
human confined in language, i.e. the apparent  rational, logical and precise human. 
A poetization that discovers the untranslatable, irrational, non-self uttering the 
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expressionless word by losing it in the paradox of truth. There the self and the 
untranslatable non-self “stand face to face,” translating one into the other, and the 
other into oneself. In translation—adapting the famous words of Blanchot—“what 
dies gives life” to translation,
“...the life that endures death and maintains itself in it”(Hegel). What wonderful 
power. But something was there and is no longer there. Something has 
disappeared. How can I recover it, how can I turn around and look at what 
exists before, if all my power consists of making it into what exists after? ... My 
hope lies in the materiality of language, in the fact that words are things, too, 
are a kind of nature.... Just now the reality of words was an obstacle. Now, it is 
my only chance. A name ceases to be the ephemeral passing of nonexistence 
and becomes a concrete ball, a solid mass of existence; language, abandoning 
the sense, the meaning which was all it wanted to be, tries to become senseless. 
Everything physical takes precedence: rhythm, weight mass, shape, and then 
the paper on which one writes, the trail of ink, the book. (Blanchot 237) 
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Notes
1. The single electron leaves its source as a particle; becomes a wave of potentials; 
interferes with itself and goes through both slits to hit the screen like a particle.
2. The electron goes through both slits, and it goes through neither, and it goes 
through just one, and it goes though just the other.
3. The section closely follows the unpublished PhD thesis of Markus Locker, The 
Power of Paradox, Monash University, Melbourne, 2010.
4. “Der Act des sich selbst Überspringens ist überall der höchste—der Urpunct—die 
Genesis des Lebens” Novalis, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs 
(Berlin: Hanser [2002], 345).
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